The Istanbul pogrom (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) was a government-instigated series of riots against the Greek minority of Istanbul in September 1955. It can be characterized as a ''crime against humanity,'' comparable in scope to the November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi authorities against Jewish civilians.
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The Istanbul pogrom (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) was a governmentinstigated series of riots against the Greek minority of Istanbul in September 1955. It can be characterized as a ''crime against humanity,'' comparable in scope to the November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi authorities against Jewish civilians.
The Septemvriana satisfies the criteria of article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) because the ''intent to destroy in whole or in part'' the Greek minority in Istanbul was demonstrably present, the pogrom having been orchestrated by the government of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Even if the number of deaths (estimated at thirty-seven) among members of the Greek community was relatively low, the result of the pogrom was the flight and emigration of the Greek minority of Istanbul, which once numbered some 100,000 and was subsequently reduced to a few thousand. The vast destruction of Greek property, businesses, and churches provides evidence of the Turkish authorities' intent to terrorize the Greeks in Istanbul into abandoning the territory, thus eliminating the Greek minority. This practice falls within the ambit of the crime of ''ethnic cleansing,'' which the UN General Assembly and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have interpreted as constituting a form of genocide.
Turkey has been a party to the UNCG since 1950. Although it is not a party to the 1968 Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, modern international law imposes the principle of non-prescription to genocide and crimes against humanity. Accordingly, the obligation to punish the guilty and the responsibility of Turkey to make reparations to the victims and their survivors have not lapsed.
Seen in isolation, the Istanbul pogrom can be considered a grave crime under both Turkish domestic law and international law. In the historical context of a religiondriven eliminationist process accompanied by many pogroms before, during, and after World War I within the territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the destruction of the Greek communities of Pontos and Asia Minor and the atrocities against the Greeks of Smyrna in September 1922, the genocidal character of the Istanbul pogrom becomes apparent. It should be noted, however, that whereas the characterization of the Septemvriana as a form of genocide lends it greater emotional impact, the legal consequences are essentially the same whether the pogrom is classified under the rubric of genocide or as a crime against humanity.
and there are reports that Greek boys were raped as well. 15 Many Greek men, including at least one priest, were subjected to forced circumcision. The riots were accompanied by enormous material damage, 16 estimated by Greek authorities at US$500 million, including the burning of churches and the devastation of shops 17 and private homes. 18 As a result of the pogrom, the Greek minority eventually emigrated from Turkey. 19 After the fall of the Menderes government in 1960, Menderes and other organizers of the pogrom were put on trial and convicted. The Yassiada trial of 1960/1961 provides abundant evidence as to the intent to terrorize and destroy the Greek minority of Istanbul. Menderes, Zorlu, and their minister of economics, Hasan Polatkan, were executed. 20 
Norms
Under customary international law, massacres such as occurred in Istanbul in September 1955 constitute international crimes. There are many norms of international law, international humanitarian law, and international human-rights law that are pertinent to an examination of the Istanbul pogrom. Under these norms, the pogrom, taken in isolation, involves a multiplicity of violations of international law. But it is in historical context that the Istanbul pogrom emerges as part of a genocidal program aimed at the destruction of the Greek presence in all territories under Turkish rule.
Massacres committed by the Ottoman authorities against the Armenians during World War I were labeled ''crimes against humanity and civilization'' by the British and the French governments as early as 1915. 21 At the end of World War I, the victorious Allies agreed that the atrocities committed against the Christian minorities under Ottoman rule-including the Armenians; the Greeks of Pontos, Asia Minor, and Eastern Thrace; and the Assyrians-should be investigated and punished and that the material damage should be compensated. Relevant precedents are article 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres, 22 which stipulated the obligation to punish, and art. 144, which stipulated the obligation to grant restitution and compensation.
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Although the Ottoman state signed the Treaty of Sèvres, formal ratification never followed, and the Allies did not follow through to ensure its implementation.
24 Such failure can be attributed to the growing international political disarray following World War I, the rise of Soviet Russia, the withdrawal of the British military presence from Turkey, 25 the isolationist policies of the United States, 26 the demise of the Young Turk regime, and the rise of Kemalism in Turkey. Nevertheless, the criminality of the massacres against Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians had been acknowledged by the international community, even though no Turkish official was ever tried before an international tribunal and only a few were indicted, tried, and convicted by Turkish courts-martial.
The term ''genocide'' was coined by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in connection with the Nazi murder of the Jews. The London Agreement of 8 August 1945 laid down the indictment for the Nuremberg trials, including the offense of ''crimes against humanity'' under art. 6(c) of the Nuremberg Statute.
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The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) 28 did not create the crime of genocide, but it formalized and codified the international prohibition of massacres. Article 1 of the UNCG stipulates that ''genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law''; art. 2 provides that genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Turkey acceded to the convention on 31 July 1950, more than five years before the events of September 1955. Of crucial importance here is the international rule of non-prescription, reflected in art. 1 of the UN Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 29 according to which the passage of time does not extinguish the obligation to prosecute in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. As a consequence of this same principle, the passage of time does not extinguish the justiciability of claims to restitution. Moreover, there is an obligation erga omnes 30 not to recognize the material consequences of genocide and crimes against humanity.
International law has continued its normative development in this direction. For example, although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has no jurisdiction in connection with the Istanbul pogrom, it expands our understanding of the concept of genocide and its criminalization. Thus, art. 4 of the 1993 Statute of the ICTY defines the crime of genocide, and art. 5(g) lists rape as a ''crime against humanity. '' 31 Similarly, art. 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines genocide in the terms of the UNCG; art. 7 defines ''crimes against humanity'' in terms more explicit than those in the Nuremberg Statute. 32 However, pursuant to art. 11 of the statute, the ICC shall have no competence ratione temporis to examine events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the statute on 1 July 2002.
In the domain of ''soft law,'' it is important to recall that in 1992 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/121, stipulating that the Yugoslav policy of ''ethnic cleansing'' was a ''form of genocide''; 33 in 1995 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 50/192, which addresses the systematic practice of rape in the context of ''ethnic cleansing'' and reaffirms that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and that under certain circumstances it constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
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In the field of international human-rights law, Turkey has been a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 15 September 2003. 35 Article 6 protects the right to life; art. 20 prohibits incitement to racial hatred and incitement to violence; art. 26 prohibits discrimination; and art. 27 guarantees the rights of minorities. In November 2006 Turkey also ratified the Optional Protocol to ICCPR, but added a reservation precluding its retroactive application. In regional international law, Turkey signed the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 4 November 1950 and ratified it on 18 May 1954. 36 Turkey also ratified Protocol I on 22 June 1953. The European Convention protects the right to life, and its Protocol I protects the right to property. The 1955 pogrom should thus also be viewed from the perspective of international human-rights law.
Case Law
Bearing in mind that law is not mathematics, judges have to determine how the norms apply to a particular set of facts. While one judge may conclude that a pogrom constitutes genocide, another may conclude that it does not go over the threshold. But since a pogrom entails multiple violations of general principles of law and of human-rights law, the obligation to punish the guilty and to provide reparation to the victims is essentially the same.
The Nuremberg judgment of 1946 convicted the Nazis of crimes against humanity, including genocide. 37 Massacres against a state's own citizens and permanent residents, such as the victims of the Kristallnacht of 9-10 November 1938, were also deemed to constitute a ''crime against humanity. '' 38 The ICTY has applied the concept of ''genocide'' to individual massacres and determined, in the judgment against General Radislav Krstić, 39 that the massacre of Srebrenica constituted genocide. 40 However, not every individual or political authority associated with the Srebrenica massacre has been charged with or convicted of genocide. The ICTY has also held that rape can in certain circumstances constitute the crime of genocide, 41 and in its 2001 judgment against Kunarac, Kovac, and Vucovic, the ICTY also found that rape constitutes a ''crime against humanity.'' 42 The principal architects of the Istanbul pogroms were tried, convicted, and punished under Turkish law in 1961. Former prime minister Menderes and a total of 592 other individuals were charged at the Yassiada trials in 1960/1961. The documentation and testimony emerging from this trial are sufficient to establish the ''intent'' of the Menderes government to ''destroy in whole or in part'' the Greek minority in Istanbul. 43 The Doctrine of State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts A general principle of international law stipulates that a state is responsible for injuries caused by its wrongful acts and must provide reparation for such injury. 44 The Permanent Court of International Justice enunciated this principle in the Chorzow Factory Case as follows: ''it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.'' 45 It should be stressed that the wrong in question is no mere violation of international law engaging interstate responsibility but the gravest criminal violation of international law, engaging, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined, international responsibility erga omnes-an obligation of the state toward the international community as a whole.
Thus, the international crime of genocide imposes obligations not only on the state that perpetrated the genocide but also on the entire international community: (a) not to recognize as legal a situation created by an international crime, (b) not to assist the author of an international crime in maintaining the illegal situation, and (c) to assist other states in the implementation of the aforementioned obligations. 46 In a very real sense, the legal impact of the erga omnes nature of the crime of genocide goes far beyond the mere retroactivity of application of the UNCG: it imposes an affirmative obligation on the international community not to recognize an illegal situation resulting from genocide. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no crime without law, no penalty without previous law), laid out in paragraph 1 of art. 15 of the ICCPR, is conditioned as follows in para. 2:
Imprescriptibility of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
Although Turkey is not a state party to the above-mentioned convention, international law is clear on the subject: there is no prescription on the prosecution of the crime of genocide, regardless of when the genocide occurred, and the obligation of the responsible state to make restitution or pay compensation for properties obtained by means of genocide does not lapse with time.
In its judgment of 6 October 1983 in the case of Klaus Barbie, the French Cour de Cassation rejected the objections of the defense and stated that the prohibition on statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is now part of customary international law. 48 France also enacted a law on 26 December 1964 dealing with crimes against humanity as ''imprescriptibles'' by nature. 49 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that ''provisions on prescription . . . are inadmissible'' when they ''are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance,'' since they ''violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights law.'' 50 
Imprescriptibility of the Right to Restitution and Compensation in Cases of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
Because of the continuing character of the crime of genocide in factual and legal terms, the remedy of restitution is not foreclosed by the passage of time. 51 Thus the survivors of the Istanbul pogrom, like the survivors of the massacres against the Greeks of Pontos and Smyrna, have standing, both individually and collectively, to advance a claim for restitution. This has also been true for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, who have successfully claimed restitution against many states where their property was destroyed or confiscated. 52 Whenever possible, restitutio in integrum (complete restitution, restoration to the previous condition) should be granted, so as to reestablish the situation that existed before the violation occurred. But where restitutio in integrum is not possible, compensation may be substituted as a remedy.
Restitution remains a continuing state responsibility also because of Turkey's current human-rights obligations under international treaty law, particularly the corpus of international human-rights law.
The
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law provide in part that
Reparation may be claimed individually and where appropriate collectively, by the direct victims of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the immediate family, dependants or other persons or groups of persons closely connected with the direct victims.
Particularly important are principle 9:
Statutes of limitations shall not apply in respect of periods during which no effective remedies exist for violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. Civil claims relating to reparations for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law shall not be subject to statutes of limitations. and principle 12:
Restitution shall be provided to re-establish the situation that existed prior to the violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. Restitution requires, inter alia, . . . return to one's place of residence and restoration of . . . property. 53 Louis Joinet, member of the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities presented two reports containing comparable language:
Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the possibility of seeking redress from the perpetrator. 54 Although the ICC, established in July 2002, does not have jurisdiction to examine instances of genocide that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute, it does reaffirm the international law obligation of providing reparation to victims. Article 75, para 1, of the Rome Statute stipulates that ''The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations,'' which it defines as restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.
This obligation under international law to make reparation for violations of rights is reaffirmed in General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. Pursuant to art. 11 of the principles enumerated in this resolution, the remedies for gross violations of human rights include the victim's right to ''(a) equal and effective access to justice; (b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; c) access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.'' Pursuant to art. 6, ''statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international law.'' 55 In the context of reparation for gross violations of human rights, two other general principles are relevant: the principle ex injuria jus non oritur (no right arises from a wrong), that no state should be allowed to profit from its own violations of law; and the principle of ''unjust enrichment.'' 56 It is a general principle of law that the criminal cannot keep the fruits of the crime. 57 In denying the applicability of statutes of limitation to restitution claims by survivors of the Holocaust, Irwin Cotler argues, The paradigm here is not that of restitution in a domestic civil action involving principles of civil and property law, or restitution in an international context involving state responsibility in matters of appropriation of property of aliens; rather, the paradigm-if there can be such a paradigm in so abhorrent a crime-is that of restitution for Nuremberg crimes, which is something dramatically different in precedent and principles. . . . Nuremberg crimes are imprescribable [sic], 58 for Nuremberg law-or international laws anchored in Nuremberg Principles-does not recognize the applicability of statutes of limitations, as set forth in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. 59 The Doctrine of Non-recognition Hersch Lauterpacht points out that the doctrine of non-recognition is based on the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur:
for the wrongdoer. That view applies to international law one of ''the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'' The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to the wrongdoer. 60 Similarly, the ''Friendly Relations'' resolution of the General Assembly stipulates that ''No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.'' 61 In cases of ''ethnic cleansing,'' the rights of the entire international community have been affected, and every state is obliged to refrain from giving recognition or effect to the consequences of the crime. For instance, art. 10 of the Draft Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers concerning the illegality of population transfers provides in part that ''Where acts or omissions prohibited in the present Declaration are committed, the international community as a whole and individual States, are under an obligation . . . not to recognize as legal the situation created by such acts.'' 62 On 9 July 2004 the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the legality of Israel's construction of a security wall, concluding that states had an obligation of non-recognition:
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. 63 
Bringing the Istanbul Pogrom before an International Tribunal
Although Turkey had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and was bound by its provisions, when the Istanbul pogrom took place, the individual complaints procedure before the European Court under art. 34 of the convention requires that petitions be submitted within six months after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Bearing in mind that the events occurred fifty-two years ago, the court would now declare the petition inadmissible ratione temporis pursuant to art. 35, para. 1, of the convention.
Interstate complaints, however, may be lodged under art. 33 of the European Convention, and any state party to the convention could submit such an interstate application. The friendly settlement procedure could lead to appropriate lump-sum reimbursements to the victims and their survivors.
Turkey ratified the ICCPR in 2003 and acceded to the Optional Protocol (OP) thereto in November 2006. By virtue of the OP, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) is thus competent to examine individual complaints against Turkey. However, Turkey has made a reservation to the OP restricting its application to facts and events occurring prior to the entry into force of the OP for Turkey, thus excluding any examination of the violations of the right to life (art. 6) and cruel and degrading treatment (art. 7) accompanying the Istanbul pogrom. Turkey has also not given the declaration, under art. 41 of the ICCPR, that would give the HRC competence to entertain interstate complaints. Thus, the only avenue of redress would be through the examination of Turkey's periodic reports to the HRC under art. 40 of the ICCPR. Although this is not a complaints procedure, the HRC would take cognizance of the failure of the state party to give appropriate restitution and compensation to the victims of the Istanbul pogrom.
Pursuant to art. 34 of the Statute of the ICJ, only states may be parties in cases before the court. Thus, individuals or groups lack standing before the ICJ. Although the court can examine ad hoc cases submitted by states parties, it cannot do so if one of the parties does not accept the ICJ's competence, and Turkey has let its declaration under art. 36(2), recognizing as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the court, expire.
A contentious case concerning the 1948 UNCG, however, could be entertained notwithstanding the absence of a declaration by Turkey under art. 36, para. 2, of the statute. Indeed, pursuant to art. 36, para. 1, this would be possible, because Turkey is a state party to the UNCG, which stipulates in article 9 that Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request to any of the parties to the dispute.
Greece has also been a party to the UNCG since 8 December 1954, that is, since before the Istanbul pogrom took place. Accordingly, it would be possible for Greece (or for any other state party to the UNCG) to argue before the ICJ that the Istanbul pogrom constituted ''genocide'' within the meaning of the convention and that Turkey is obliged to ensure appropriate compensation to the victims and their survivors.
Greece (or any state party to the UNCG) could also invoke art. 8 of the UNCG, which provides that any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action as they consider appropriate for the ''suppression'' of genocide. ''Suppression'' must mean more than just retributive justice. In order to suppress the crime, it is necessary to suppress, as far as possible, its consequences. This entails, besides punishing the guilty, providing restitution and compensation to the surviving generations.
Another possibility would be to have the UN General Assembly, pursuant to art. 96 of the UN Charter, refer the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, as was done in the cases relating to South Africa's presence in Namibia in 1970 and of Israel's security wall in 2003. 64 The ICJ could, pursuant to art. 65 of the ICJ Statute, consider the question of whether the consistent pattern of Turkey's anti-Greek measures constituted ''crimes against humanity'' or ''genocide,'' and could then fix the level of compensation and restitution required.
Admittedly, the criminal law aspects of the UNCG are of lesser relevance in the context of the Istanbul pogrom, since most of the principal perpetrators of the Septemvriana are no longer alive or are too old to be prosecuted. On the other hand, the Greek properties that were destroyed, for which their owners were not sufficiently compensated, give rise to legitimate claims against the Turkish state. In this context, it is worth noting the important restitution of many churches and monasteries in the former Soviet republics, including Armenia-restitution effected in the 1990s for confiscations that had occurred some seventy years earlier, following the Bolshevik revolution. 65 Based on this precedent, compensation for the damage caused to Greek churches and monasteries would appear to be not only morally mandated but also implementable in practice.
A determination by the ICJ that Istanbul Program constituted a form of genocide would facilitate the settlement of claims for restitution, including the identification of cultural and other properties destroyed, such as churches, monasteries, and other assets of historic and cultural significance to the Greek communities of Turkey.
Conclusion
The Istanbul pogrom was a phase in the Ottoman/Turkish policy of eliminating Greek communities from their 3,000-year-old homelands in Asia Minor, Thrace, the Aegean, and Constantinople itself. Seen in the context of a centuries-old process of discrimination, massacres, and expulsion, it can be classified as a form of genocide.
66
At the same time, the Istanbul pogrom also falls within the definition of crimes against humanity in both the Nuremberg Statute and in the Rome Statute of the ICC. Because these crimes are not subject to statutes of limitations, Turkey still has important international legal obligations to meet.
Turkey aspires to membership in the European Union, which is a community not only of commercial interests but also of certain fundamental moral values. By acknowledging its responsibility for the Istanbul pogrom, for other massacres, and for the consistent pattern of religious intolerance, 67 Turkey would make its commitment to human rights, including the right to truth, 68 . According to Whitman, The Greeks of Turkey, 8, ''More than 4,000 Greek shops were sacked and plundered; 38 Churches were burned down and 35 more churches vandalized; two monasteries and the main Greek Orthodox cemeteries were vandalized and, in some cases, destroyed; more than 2,000 Greek homes were vandalized and robbed, and 52 Greek schools were stripped of their furniture, books and equipment.'' 10. Targets were marked with paint, and the attackers had lists, as was the case on Kristallnacht. 11. Vryonis, Mechanism of Catastrophe, 211. 12. The American consul general telegraphed the US State Department to report that ''the destruction was completely out of hand with no evidence of police or military attempts to control it. I personally witnessed the looting of many shops while the police stood idly by or cheered on the mob.'' Whitman, The Greeks of Turkey, 7. 13. Human Rights Watch is a New York-based non-governmental organization, founded in 1978 as Helsinki Watch. 14. Vryonis, Mechanism of Catastrophe, 222. The estimates go as high as 2,000 rapes.
One of the most frequently mentioned cases of rape involved the Working Girls' Hostel on the island of Bü yü kada (Prinkipo). List of victims were established by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and by the Greek consul general.
15. Ibid., 224. 16. The US Consulate in Istanbul sent a dispatch to the State Department on 27 September 1955 which reads in part, ''A survey of the damage inflicted on public establishments of the Greek Community of Istanbul during the rioting on the night of September 6-7 shows that the destruction caused has been extremely widespread. In fact, only a very small percentage of community property appears to have escaped molestation. Although there are as yet no figures available assessing the damage sustained, the number of establishments attacked and the nature of the destruction caused . . . convey a clear picture of the scope of the devastation. In most cases the assault on these establishments involved a thorough wrecking of installations, furniture, equipment, desecration of holy shrines and relics, and looting. In certain instances serious damage was inflicted on the buildings themselves by fire.'' Whitman, Heydrich, the architects of Kristallnacht? What would the reaction of the international community have been if, instead of making moral and material reparation, the German government had refused to render restitution and compensation to the victims and their survivors?
